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Many central banks have adopted a formal inflation-targeting 
framework based on the belief and the theoretical predictions that 
an explicit and clearly communicated numerical objective for the 
level of inflation over a specified period would, in itself, be a strong 
communication device that would help anchor long-term inflation 
expectations.1 Empirically verifying the success of inflation-targeting 
regimes in this dimension has been difficult, however, as survey data 
on long-term inflation expectations tend to be of limited availability 
and low frequency.2
In compiling the data for this project, we received invaluable assistance from 
Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel and Mauricio Larraín. The paper also benefited from very 
helpful discussions, comments, and suggestions from Frederic Mishkin, Eric Parrado, 
Scott Roger, Brian Sack, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Lars Svensson, and Jonathan Wright. 
We also appreciate the excellent research assistance of Claire Hausman and Oliver 
Levine. The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors, 
and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
or any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System.
1. See, for example, Leiderman and Svensson (1995); Bernanke and Mishkin (1997); 
Svensson (1997); Bernanke and others (1999).
2. For an analysis using semiannual survey data on long-run inflation expectations 
in the 1990s and early 2000s for a panel of countries, see Levin and Piger (2002).
Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, edited by Frederic Mishkin and 
Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Santiago, Chile. © 2007 Central Bank of Chile.
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In this paper, we use daily bond yield data for Canada, 
Chile, and the United States to investigate whether long-term 
inflation expectations in these countries are anchored, essentially 
extending the analysis of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) 
and Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006) to examine comparable 
data for Canada and Chile. Of these three countries, Canada and 
Chile have been formal inflation targeters throughout much of 
the 1990s and 2000s, while the United States has not had an 
explicit numerical inflation objective. We test the success of 
inflation targeting in anchoring long-term inflation expectations 
by comparing the behavior of long-term nominal and indexed 
bond yields across these three countries in response to important 
economic developments. Forward inflation compensation—defined 
as the difference between forward rates on nominal and inflation-
indexed bonds—provides us with a high-frequency measure of the 
compensation that investors require to cover the expected level of 
inflation, as well as the risks associated with inflation, at a given 
horizon. If far-ahead forward inflation compensation is relatively 
insensitive to incoming economic news, then one could reasonably 
infer that financial market participants have fairly stable views 
regarding the distribution of long-term inflation outcomes. This is 
precisely the outcome one would hope to observe in the presence 
of an explicit and credible inflation target.
The daily frequency of our bond yield data, together with the 
frequent release of important macroeconomic statistics and monetary 
policy announcements, provides a large event-study data set for our 
analysis. This holds even for samples that span only a few years—the 
period for which we have inflation-indexed bond data for the United 
States and long-term nominal bond data for Chile. Thus, in contrast 
to previous empirical work using quarterly or even semiannual data, 
we are able to bring to bear thousands of daily observations of the 
response of long-term bond yields to major economic news releases in 
Canada, Chile, and the United States.
For the United States, we find that far-ahead forward nominal 
interest rates and inflation compensation respond significantly and 
systematically to a wide variety of macroeconomic data releases and 
monetary policy announcements. These responses are all consistent 
with a model in which the private sector’s view of the central bank’s 
long-run inflation objective is not strongly anchored, as we show. 
In Canada, far-ahead forward nominal interest rates and inflation 
compensation display little or no such sensitivity to either domestic 
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or foreign economic news. Thus, the anchoring of long-run inflation 
expectations in Canada appears to be stronger than in the United 
States. Finally, the data for Chile is more limited in terms of the 
sample period, the depth and breadth of fixed income markets, and 
the availability of domestic macroeconomic data releases. Despite 
these limitations, we do not find significant responses of far-ahead 
inflation compensation in Chile with respect to domestic or foreign 
macroeconomic news.3
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 
presents two reference models of the economy to act as benchmarks 
for comparison with our empirical results. Section 2 investigates 
the responses of far-ahead forward interest rates and inflation 
compensation in the United States to economic news and shows that 
these rates respond by much more than standard models would predict. 
Section 3 discusses possible explanations for this finding. Section 4 
repeats our empirical analysis for Canada and Chile to investigate 
the extent to which inflation targeting may help anchor the private 
sector’s views regarding the long-run inflation objective of the central 
bank. Section 5 concludes. An appendix provides a detailed description 
of all the data used in our analysis.
1. LONG-RUN IMPLICATIONS OF MACROECONOMIC MODELS
To aid the interpretation of our econometric results, it is useful 
to have a reference model as a benchmark. We consider two standard 
macroeconomic models: a pure new Keynesian model (taken from 
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 2000) and a modification of that model 
that allows for a significant fraction of backward-looking or rule-
of-thumb agents (taken from Rudebusch, 2001). These two models 
can be thought of as different parameterizations of the following 
equations:
π µ π µ π γ ε π π π
π
t t t t t t E A L y = + − ( ) ( ) + + +1 1  and                                  (1)
y E y A L y i E t y t t y y t t t t t
y = + − ( ) ( ) − − ( )+ + + µ µ β π ε 1 1 1 ,                          (2)
where π denotes the inflation rate, y the output gap, and i the 
short-term nominal interest rate, and επ and εy are independent 
3. Ertürk and Özlale (2005) obtain a similar finding of anchored expectations for 
Chile using a GARCH specification on monthly Chilean data.
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and identically distributed (i.i.d.) shocks.4 The parameters µπ and µy 
describe the degree of forward-looking behavior in the model, and the 
lag polynomials Aπ(L) and Ay(L) summarize the parameters governing 
the dynamics of any backward-looking components of the model.
The two models differ in the extent of their forward-looking behavior. 
The pure new Keynesian model assumes that agents are completely 
forward looking (µπ = µy = 1), and the parameter values for the equations 
are taken from Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000). A number of authors, 
however, estimate much smaller values of µπ (around 0.3) to match 
the degree of inflation persistence observed in U.S. data (for example, 
Fuhrer, 1997; Roberts, 1997; Rudebusch, 2001; Estrella and Fuhrer, 
2002). Thus, in the second model considered, we set µπ = 0.3 and take 
parameter values from Rudebusch (2001).5 Note that Rudebusch’s model 
is among the most persistent of the hybrid new Keynesian models in the 
literature, owing to the inclusion of several lags of output and inflation 
in equations (1) and (2) and a particularly low value of µy (Rudebusch 
assumes µy = 0) in the income-spending (IS) equation (equation 2).
We close these two models with an interest rate rule of the 
following form:
i c a by ci t t t t t
i = − ( ) + ( ) + 
 
+ + − 1 1 1 π ε ,                                                  (3)
whereπdenotes the trailing four-quarter moving average of inflation, 
εi is an i.i.d. shock, and a, b, and c are the parameters of the rule.6 
Note that the policy rule is both backward-looking, in that the 
interest rate responds to current values of the output gap and 
inflation rather than their forecasts, and inertial, in that it includes 
the lagged federal funds rate. Both of these characteristics tend to 
add inertia to the short rate, which, together with the persistence 
of the Rudebusch model, generally gives the model the best possible 
chance to explain the term structure evidence we find below. We 
include an interest rate shock,  εt
i , for the purpose of generating 
impulse response functions.
4. These variables are all normalized to have steady-state values of zero.
5. Rudebusch estimates and uses a value of µ = 0.29 in the inflation equation and 
sets µ = 0 in the output equation, so we use those values as well. There are also some 
minor timing differences between the specification of Rudebusch’s model and equations 
(1) and (2). To generate the impulse response functions in figure 1, we use the model 
exactly as specified in Rudebusch (2001), but these differences in specification have no 
discernible effect on our results. 
6. We use the values of a, b, and c estimated by Rudebusch (2002) from 1987:4 to 
1999:4: namely, a = 0.53, b = 0.93, and c = 0.73.
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The three panels of figure 1 show the response of the short-term 
nominal interest rate to a one-percent shock to the inflation equation, 
the output equation, and the interest rate equation, respectively, 
under our two baseline models.7 In the pure new Keynesian 
(Clarida, Galí, and Gertler) model, the effect of the macroeconomic 
and monetary policy shocks on the short-term interest rate dies out 
very quickly, generally within a year. The interest rate displays much 
more persistence in the partially backward-looking (Rudebusch) 
model. Even in that model, however, the short-term interest rate 
essentially returns to its steady-state level well within ten years 
after each shock.
2. THE SENSITIVITY OF U.S. LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES 
TO ECONOMIC NEWS
We now turn to how well the above model predictions are matched 
by U.S. data. The models predict that macroeconomic data releases 
and monetary policy announcements should affect the path of 
nominal interest rates only in the short run. To examine whether 
the U.S. data match the predictions of the models, we must look 
beyond the response of interest rates in the first few years after a 
shock and instead focus on the behavior of forward interest rates 
several years ahead.
Forward rates are often a very useful means of interpreting the 
term structure of interest rates. For a bond with a maturity of m 
years, the yield rt
m ( )represents the rate of return that an investor 
requires to lend money today in return for a single payment m years 
in the future (for the case of a zero-coupon bond). By comparison, the 
k-year-ahead one-year forward rate ft
k ( ) represents the rate of return 
from period t + k to period t + k + 1 that the same investor would 
require to commit today to a one-year loan beginning at time t + k 
and maturing at time t + k + 1. The linkage between these concepts 
7. In a discussion of our paper at the Central Bank of Chile, Eric Parrado reported 
impulse response functions using the small open economy international macroeconomic 
model of Galí and Monacelli (2005), roughly calibrated to match the data in Canada 
and Chile. The results from those impulse response functions were consistent with our 
analysis for the standard closed economy new Keynesian models presented here: in 
particular, short-term interest rates returned to steady state well within ten years of a 
shock. Indeed, that model returned to steady state even more quickly—within just four 
or five years, compared to seven or eight years for the Rudebusch model. We believe 
this difference is due to the persistent parameters of the Rudebusch model, rather than 
to the lack of an open economy transmission mechanism in that model.
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Macroeconomic Models
Interest rate response to a 1 percent inflation shock
Interest rate response to a 1 percent output shock
Interest rate response to a 1 percent interest rate shock
Source: Authors' computations.
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is simple: an m-year (continuously-compounded) zero-coupon security 
can be viewed as a sequence of one-year forward agreements over 
the next m years:8
 





k ( ) + ( ) ( ) = + ( ) − 1
1 .                                                                     (4)
For our analysis, we use Federal Reserve Board data on forward 
interest rates for U.S. Treasury securities.9 Given our interest in 
measuring long-term expectations, our analysis focuses on the longest 
maturity for which we have high-quality bond yield data. The liquidity 
and breadth of the markets for government securities at and around 
the ten-year horizon thus lead us to focus on the one-year forward 
rate nine years ahead (that is, the one-year forward rate ending in ten 
years). The analysis of the previous section shows that this horizon 
is sufficiently far out for standard macroeconomic models to largely 
return to their steady states, so that any movements in forward 
interest rates or inflation compensation at these horizons should not 
be due to transitory responses of the economy to an economic shock.
To measure the effects of macroeconomic data releases on interest 
rates, the unexpected (or surprise) component of each macroeconomic 
data release must be computed, since the expected component of 
macroeconomic data releases should have no effect in forward-looking 
financial markets.10 Using the surprise components of macroeconomic 
data releases, where expectations are measured just a few days before 
the actual release, also removes any possible issue of endogeneity 
arising from interest rates feeding back to the macroeconomy. Any 
such effects, to the extent that they are systematic or predictable, will 
be incorporated into the market forecast for the statistical release.
To measure the surprise component of each data release, we compute 
the difference between the actual release and the median forecast of 
8. If we could observe zero-coupon yields directly, computing forward rates would be 
as simple as this. In practice, however, most government bonds in the United States and 
abroad make regular coupon payments, and thus the size and timing of the coupons must 
be accounted for to translate observed yields into the implied zero-coupon yield curve. 
In the results presented below, we also investigate whether the use of U.S Treasury 
STRIPS (which are zero-coupon securities that thus do not require fitting a yield curve 
first) alters the estimated response of far-ahead forward nominal rates in the United 
States. We find that the STRIPS data yield essentially identical results.
9. The Federal Reserve Board computes implied zero-coupon yields from observed, 
off-the-run U.S. Treasury yields using the extension of Nelson-Siegel described in 
Svensson (1994). Details are available in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2005).
10. Kuttner (2001) tests and confirms this hypothesis for the case of monetary 
policy announcements.
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that release made by professional forecasters just a few days prior to the 
release date. For the United States, we use data on professional forecasts 
of the next week’s statistical releases, published every Friday by Money 
Market Services for thirty-nine different macroeconomic data series.11 
Not all thirty-nine of these macroeconomic statistics have a significant 
impact on interest rates, even at the short end of the yield curve. Thus, 
to conserve space and reduce the number of exogenous variables in our 
regressions, we restrict our attention to the macroeconomic variables that 
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) identify as having statistically 
significant effects on the one-year Treasury bill rate over the 1990–2002 
period: capacity utilization, consumer confidence, the core consumer 
price index (CPI), the employment cost index (ECI), the advance (that 
is, first) release of real GDP, initial claims for unemployment insurance, 
the National Association of Purchasing Managers (NAPM) / Institute 
for Supply Management (ISM) survey of manufacturing activity, new 
home sales, employees on nonfarm payrolls, retail sales, and the 
unemployment rate.12
As with macroeconomic data releases, we must compute the 
surprise component of monetary policy announcements in each of 
our countries in order to measure the effects of these announcements 
on interest rates. We measure monetary policy surprises for the United 
States using federal funds futures rates, which provide high-quality, 
virtually continuous measures of market expectations for the federal 
funds rate (Krueger and Kuttner, 1996; Rudebusch, 1998; Brunner, 
2000).13 The federal funds futures contract for a given month settles 
at the end of the month based on the average federal funds rate that 
was realized over the course of that month. Thus, daily changes in the 
current-month futures rate reflect revisions to the market’s expectations 
for the federal funds rate over the remainder of the month. As explained 
in Kuttner (2001) and Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2002), the 
11. Several authors find the Money Market Services data to be of high quality (for 
example, Balduzzi, Elton, and Green, 2001; Andersen and others, 2003; Gurkaynak, 
Sack, and Swanson, 2005).
12. In addition to these eleven variables, Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) 
also included leading indicators and the core producer price index in their analysis. 
We originally included these two variables as well, but they never entered significantly 
into any of our regressions at even the shortest horizon at even the ten percent level. 
We therefore omit them from the results below to save space and reduce the number 
of explanatory variables. Nonetheless, our results are essentially identical whether we 
include these additional variables in the regressions or not.
13. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2002) show that, among the many possible 
financial market instruments that potentially reflect expectations of monetary policy, 
federal funds futures are the best predictor of future policy actions.
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change in the current month’s contract rate on the day of a Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) announcement, scaled up to account for the 
timing of the announcement within the month, provides a measure of the 
surprise component of the FOMC decision.14 We compute the surprise 
component associated with every FOMC meeting and intermeeting 
policy action by the FOMC over our sample.15
2.1 The Sensitivity of U.S. Interest Rates to Economic 
News
Table 1 reports results for nominal interest rates in the United 
States over the 1994–2005 period.16 Each column provides results 
from a regression of daily changes in the corresponding interest 
rate on the surprise component of the macroeconomic data releases 
and monetary policy announcements listed at the left.17 We 
regress the change in interest rates on all of our macroeconomic 
and monetary policy surprises jointly to properly account for days 
on which more than one piece of economic news was released. To 
facilitate interpreting our coefficient estimates, we normalize each 
macroeconomic surprise by its standard deviation. Each coefficient 
in the table thus estimates the interest rate response in basis points 
per standard deviation surprise in the corresponding macroeconomic 
statistic. The one exception to this rule is the monetary policy 
surprises, which we leave in basis points, so that these coefficients 
represent a basis point per basis point response.
14. To avoid very large scale factors, if the monetary policy announcement occurs 
in the last seven days of the month, we use the next-month contract rate instead of 
scaling up the current-month contract rate.
15. The only exception is that we exclude the intermeeting 50 basis point easing 
on 17 September 2001, because financial markets were closed for several days prior 
to that action and because that easing was a response to a large exogenous shock to 
the U.S. economy and financial markets. We would thus have difficulty disentangling 
the effect of the monetary policy action from the effect of the shock itself on financial 
markets that day.
16. Our STRIPS data begin in 1994, so we restrict analysis in table 1 to the post-
1994 period. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) report very similar results for the 
1990–2002 period using forward rates from a fitted yield curve.
17. Although we have almost one thousand daily observations in each of these 
regressions, most of the elements of any individual regressor are zero, because any given 
macroeconomic statistic is only released once a month (or once a quarter in the case of GDP 
and once a week in the case of initial claims). We restrict attention in all our regressions 
to those days on which some macroeconomic statistic was released or a monetary policy 
announcement was made, but our results are not sensitive to this restriction.

























































































No. observations 1,371 1,371 1,371
R2 0.16 0.06 0.05
Joint test p value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Source: Authors' computations.
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. *** Statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. The sample is from January 1994 to October 2005, at daily frequency on the dates of macroeconomic and 
monetary policy announcements. Regressions also include a constant, a Y2K dummy that takes on the value of 
1 on the first business day of 2000, and a year-end dummy that takes on the value of 1 on the first business day 
of any year (coefficients not reported). Macroeconomic data release surprises are normalized by their standard 
deviations, so these coefficients represent a basis point per standard deviation response. Monetary policy surprises 
are in basis points, so these coefficients represent a basis point per basis point response. Joint test p value is 
for the hypothesis that all coefficients (other than the constant and dummy variables) are zero. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. 
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The first column of table 1 reports the responses of the one-year 
Treasury spot rate to the economic releases as a benchmark for 
comparison. As one might expect from a Taylor-type rule or from 
casual observation of U.S. financial markets, interest rates at the 
short end of the term structure exhibit highly significant responses 
to surprises in macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy 
announcements. Moreover, these responses are generally consistent 
with what one would expect from a Taylor-type rule: upward surprises 
in inflation, output, or employment lead to increases in short-term 
interest rates, and upward surprises in initial jobless claims (a 
countercyclical economic indicator) cause short-term interest rates 
to fall. The magnitudes of these estimates seem reasonable, with a 
two-standard-deviation surprise leading to about a 3 to 10 basis point 
change in the one-year rate (depending on the statistic) on average over 
our sample. Monetary policy surprises lead to about a one-for-three 
or one-for-two response of the one-year yield to the federal funds rate. 
This is consistent with the view that a surprise change in the federal 
funds rate is often not a complete surprise to markets, but rather a 
moving forward or pushing back of policy changes that were already 
expected to have some chance of occurring in the future.
The middle column of table 1 shows the response of far-ahead 
forward interest rates in the U.S. to economic news. If ten years is 
a sufficient amount of time for the U.S. economy to return largely to 
steady state following an economic shock, as our simulations above 
suggest, and if long-term inflation expectations were firmly anchored in 
the United States, then one would expect to see little or no response of 
these rates to economic news. This is not the case, however: far-ahead 
forward nominal rates in the United States respond significantly to 
nine of the twelve macroeconomic data releases we consider, often with 
a very high degree of statistical significance, and a test of the joint 
hypothesis that all coefficients in the regression are zero is rejected 
with a p value on the order of 10-10. Not only are the estimated 
coefficients statistically significant, but their magnitudes are large, 
often more than half as large as the effect on the short-term interest 
rate. Finally, the signs of these coefficients are not random, but 
rather they closely resemble the effect on short-term interest rates 
and the short-term inflation outlook. This resemblance is consistent 
with markets expecting some degree of pass-through of short-term 
inflation to the long-term inflation outlook. The case of monetary 
policy surprises offers perhaps the most striking example of this 
pattern: the estimated effect of monetary policy surprises on far-
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ahead nominal interest rates is opposite to the effect of surprises on 
the one-year spot rate—that is, a surprise monetary policy tightening 
causes far-ahead forward nominal rates to fall. This result echoes the 
finding by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) for their 1990–2002 
and 1994–2002 samples. It is also consistent with financial markets 
expecting a pass-through of the short-term inflation outlook to long-
term inflation, as we demonstrate in section 3, below.
The right-hand column of table 1 reports a robustness check on 
the above results, in which we computed the response of the one-year 
forward rate ending in ten years using U.S. Treasury STRIPS rather 
than the Federal Reserve’s smoothed yield curve data.18 STRIPS are 
pure zero-coupon securities whose yields provide a direct, market-
based measure of forward rates that does not require any yield curve 
fitting or smoothing. (On the other hand, STRIPS are less liquid than 
Treasury notes and bonds and thus suffer from larger bid-ask spreads 
and trading costs, making observed prices a less clean measure of the 
true shadow value of the securities and introducing some noise into 
our estimates.) The results in the right-hand column of table 1 are very 
much in line with those from the middle column: seven of the twelve 
macroeconomic news releases we consider lead to significant responses 
of ten-year-ahead forward interest rates, with estimated magnitudes 
that are very similar to those from our yield-curve-based estimates, 
and the joint hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero is 
likewise rejected at extremely high levels of statistical significance 
(p value on the order of 10-9). All of these observations suggest that 
our results are not due to any artifact of yield-curve fitting involved 
in computing forward rates from Treasury coupon securities.
2.2 The Sensitivity of U.S. Interest Rates and Inflation 
Compensation to Economic News
The United States has issued inflation-indexed Treasury securities 
since 1997. A natural question arising from our estimates above, then, 
is to what extent the strong responses in far-ahead forward interest 
rates are due to changes in real interest rates, as opposed to changes 
18. U.S. Treasury STRIPS (Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal 
Securities) are created by decoupling the individual coupon and principal payments from 
U.S. Treasury notes and bonds into pure zero-coupon securities. See Sack (2000) for 
more details and the potential usefulness of STRIPS for estimating the Treasury yield 
curve. In this paper, we compute the one-year forward rate ending in ten years using the 
nine-year STRIPS security and ten-year STRIPS security and applying equation (1). 
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in inflation compensation—the difference between nominal and real 
interest rates. Table 2 investigates this interesting question.
The primary shortcoming of U.S. Treasury inflation-indexed 
securities—commonly referred to as TIPS—is that they were issued 
for the first time in January 1997 and only annually for the first 
few years after that date. We therefore cannot compute a far-ahead 
forward real rate for the United States until January 1998, giving us 
a sample that covers only about seven and a half years. Nonetheless, 
the high frequency of the data still leaves us with almost a thousand 
observations with which to perform our analysis.
We obtained data on the forward real interest rates implied by 
TIPS from the Federal Reserve Board.19 We define forward inflation 
compensation as the difference between the forward nominal rate 
and forward real rate at each horizon. This measure captures the 
compensation that investors demand both for expected inflation at 
the given horizon and for the risks or uncertainty associated with 
that inflation.20
In the first two columns of table 2, we repeat the regressions of 
the one-year spot rate and the ten-year-ahead one-year rate on our 
macroeconomic surprises over the sample of TIPS data (1998–2005). 
Our results over this sample are very similar to those in table 1, 
although the statistical significance is reduced for our coefficient 
estimates in both regressions. For example, only five of our twelve 
coefficients for the ten-year-ahead nominal rate are significant over 
this shorter sample, compared with nine of twelve in table 1, although 
the joint hypothesis that all coefficients are zero in that regression is 
still rejected at very high levels of statistical significance.21 The signs 
and magnitudes of the coefficients in these two columns are also very 
similar to those we estimated over the larger 1994–2005 period.
19. The Federal Reserve Board provides real yield curve estimates beginning in 
January 1999. We extend the nine- to ten-year forward rate series back to January 1998 
by taking the nine- and ten-year TIPS rates and computing the implied forward rate 
between the two using Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz’s (1983) approximation.
20. Forward real rates, nominal rates, and inflation compensation may also be 
affected by other factors, such as term premiums and premiums for liquidity. We discuss 
the robustness of all of our results with respect to these types of risk premiums in the 
next section.
21. The significance of the negative response of forward nominal rates to monetary 
policy surprises is notably absent over this later sample, perhaps reflecting the fact 
that these surprises become generally smaller and less frequent in the later part of 
our sample (Swanson, 2005). Another possible explanation for the smaller number 
of significant coefficients over the later sample is that long-term interest rates have 
gradually become better anchored in the United States. We leave this as an interesting 
question for future research.
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In the third and fourth columns of table 2, we decompose the 
response of forward nominal rates into its constituent real rate and 
inflation compensation components. We find some evidence that part of 
the estimated responsiveness of nominal forward rates is actually due 
to movements in real interest rates, particularly for the NAPM/ISM 
manufacturing survey and nonfarm payrolls releases.22 In the majority 
of cases, however, the responsiveness of long-term nominal interest 
rates is due at least partially to changes in inflation compensation. 
Five of our twelve estimated coefficients are statistically significant, 
and the joint hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is rejected with 
a p value of about 1 percent.
3. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE BEHAVIOR OF U.S. 
LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES
In steady state, the short-term nominal interest rate, i*, equals 
the steady-state real interest rate, r*, plus the steady-state level of 
inflation, π*, by Fisher’s equation:
i r
* * * = +π .                                                                                         (5)
As mentioned above, standard asset-pricing theory indicates that 
forward rates with sufficiently long horizons—that is, ft
N ( ) for N 
large, where ft
N ( ) is the forward rate ending in N years’ time—equal 
the expected steady-state short-term rate plus a risk premium, ρ:
f r t
N ( ) * * = + + π ρ.                                                                                (6)
The fact that ft
N ( ) responds to many macroeconomic data releases and 
monetary policy surprises indicates that one (or more) of r*, π*, and 
ρ is changing in response to these surprises.
3.1 Some Nonexplanations for the Excess Sensitivity 
Puzzle: r* and ρ
In our search for a solution to the excess sensitivity puzzle documented 
above, we consider, but ultimately discard, two possible causes: changes 
22. We do not take a stand on why far-ahead real rates might move in response to 
economic news, although one possible explanation is that markets view the particular 
data release as informative about the economy’s long-run rate of productivity growth 
and, hence, about the equilibrium real interest rate.
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in r* (the long-run equilibrium real interest rate) and changes in ρ (the 
risk premium). Although r* is a potentially time-varying component 
of steady-state short-term rates, our results for the nominal forward 
rates are probably not due to r* responding to surprises. We have two 
reasons for ruling out time variance in steady-state real rates as the 
main culprit. First, TIPS provide a measure of far-ahead forward real 
rates, and as we showed in table 2, the sensitivity of nominal rates in 
the United States to economic news was almost always attributable to 
changes in inflation compensation, rather than to changes in real rates. 
Second, many of the nominal interest rate responses that we estimate 
are difficult to interpret in terms of changes in r*. For example, it is 
difficult to explain why a surprise uptick in inflation (of either the CPI 
or the PPI) would lead the market to revise upward its estimate of r*, 
the long-run equilibrium real rate of interest.23 Similarly, a surprise 
monetary policy tightening is not likely to lead the market to revise its 
estimate of r* downward—presumably, a surprise tightening of policy, 
to the extent that it provides any information about r*, indicates that 
the FOMC views r* as being higher than the market estimate.
This is not to say that changes in the market’s perception of r* are 
necessarily unimportant. Indeed, changes in r* may have had some 
effect on long-term interest rates in our sample, particularly in the 
late 1990s, when market estimates of the long-run rate of productivity 
growth in the United States were largely in flux. Relying solely on 
changes in r* to explain our empirical results, however, is likely to 
cause difficulties for precisely the reasons described above.
Alternatively, one might argue that changes in the risk premium, 
ρ, are the most likely explanation for our findings of excess sensitivity 
in long-term interest rates. While some authors find little evidence 
for time-varying risk premiums in the data (for example, Bekaert, 
Hodrick, and Marshall, 2001), a number of prominent studies (such 
as Fama and Bliss, 1987; Campbell and Shiller, 1991) document 
strong violations of the expectations hypothesis for a wide variety of 
samples and securities, suggesting that the risk premiums embedded 
in long-term bond yields may, in fact, vary substantially over time. 
A time-varying risk premium is often offered as an explanation for 
the excess volatility puzzle and as a likely factor in the failure of the 
expectations hypothesis for longer maturities.
23. Even if one regards surprises in inflation as being informative about productivity 
growth in the late 1990s, the usual story that is told is that surprisingly low inflation 
was indicative of high productivity growth, which would, in turn, be related to a higher 
equilibrium real rate, r*.
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For our analysis, however, as long as the variation in risk 
premiums is small enough at the very high frequencies we consider, 
the change in bond yields over the course of the day will effectively 
difference out the risk premium at each point in our sample, allowing 
us to interpret the change in yields as being driven primarily by the 
change in expectations. While there is no a priori reason  why risk 
premiums should vary only at lower frequencies, the predictors of 
excess returns on bonds emphasized in the studies above generally 
have this feature—that is, the variation from one day to the next is 
very small, while the large variations in premiums that they estimate 
occur at much lower frequencies, particularly the business cycle 
(Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005; Piazzesi and Swanson, 2004). Thus, 
the failure of the expectations hypothesis alone is not sufficient to 
call our analysis into question.
Nevertheless, risk premiums are poorly understood, so the fact 
that previous estimates of time-varying risk have generally found 
predictability only at lower frequencies does not imply that they 
could not change appreciably from one day to the next. In order 
for changes in risk premiums to explain our results, however, one 
would have to explain why they would move so systematically in the 
way that we document, being positively correlated with output and 
inflation news while moving inversely with surprises in monetary 
policy.24 Moreover, one would have to explain why we do not find 
similar movements in risk premiums in the United Kingdom 
or Sweden, as documented in Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson 
(2006)—if anything, one would expect the importance of risk 
premiums to be greater in these smaller, less liquid markets—or 
why the behavior of risk premiums in the United Kingdom would 
have changed after the Bank of England gained independence 
from Parliament in 1997 (Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2003; 
Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson, 2006). 
Given that current theory puts little structure on the behavior of 
term premiums, one can write an ad hoc model of the term premium 
that would match our empirical findings. However, the fact that we did 
not observe a strong response of real interest rates to economic news 
24. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) find that risk 
premiums in Treasury securities and interest rate futures move countercyclically over 
the business cycle. This is exactly opposite to the direction that would be needed to 
explain our findings that far-ahead forward interest rates in the United States and in 
the United Kingdom before central bank independence comove positively with surprises 
in output and employment.
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in the United States suggests that if changes in risk premiums are 
responsible for the excess sensitivity of the forward nominal rates, any 
such risk seems to be more closely related to inflation compensation 
than to real rates. This is in line with our interpretation that it is the 
perceived distribution of future inflation outcomes (and not necessarily 
only its mean) that is unanchored. 
3.2 A Possible Explanation for Excess Sensitivity: 
Changes in π*
While we do not wish to discount the importance of changes 
in market perceptions of r* or changes in risk premiums that are 
unrelated to inflation, we find each of them inadequate on its own 
to explain all of our empirical results. We now show that changes in 
the market’s perception of π*, the long-run inflation objective of the 
central bank, helps explain all of our findings. Thus, changes in π* 
are not only necessary for explaining at least some of our results, but 
also sufficient.25
Model with time-varying π* and perfect information
We demonstrate the sufficiency of changes in π* by augmenting 
the benchmark model from section 1 to include an additional equation 
that permits the central bank’s inflation objective to vary over time, 
without taking a stand on why this might be so. In this alternative 
specification, past values of inflation affect the central bank’s inflation 
target. Our assumed functional form for the time-variance in π* is
π π θ π π ε
π
t t t t t
* * * * = + − ( )+ − − − 1 1 1 ,                                                             (7)
whereπt−1 is the trailing four-quarter moving average of inflation. 
Thus, persistently low (high) inflation will, over time, tend to decrease 
(increase) the central bank’s long-run inflation target.26 Exogenous 





25. While the model presented below is based on time variance in the perceived 
mean of the steady-state inflation distribution, the results would go through if other 
moments of that distribution were time varying, as well. These would be reflected in 
the inflation term premium. 
26. This has some similarities to the idea of opportunistic disinflation described 
in Orphanides and Wilcox (2002).
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Our benchmark model with time-varying π* thus takes the 
form:
π µ π µ π γ ε π π π
π
t t t t t t E A L y = + − ( ) ( ) + + +1 1 ,                                        (8)
y E y A L y i E t y t t y y t t t t t
y = + − ( ) ( ) − − ( )+ + + µ µ β π ε 1 1 1 ,                          (9)
i c a by ci t t t t t t t
i = − ( ) + − ( )+ 


+ + − 1 1 π π π ε
* , and                              (10)
π π θ π π ε
π
t t t t t
* * * * = + − ( )+ − − − 1 1 1 ,                                                           (11)
where equation (10) now explicitly recognizes the existence of a time-
varying inflation target. We use the same parameter values for the 
model as for the Rudebusch specification in section 1, and we select 
a value for θ to roughly calibrate our impulse response functions to 
match the estimated responsiveness of long-term forward rates in 
our data. It turns out that we require relatively small values for θ 
(the loading of the central bank’s inflation target on the past year’s 
inflation) to match the term structure evidence. We thus set θ equal 
to 0.02 for the simulations below, implying that annual inflation 
one percentage point above target leads the central bank to raise 
its target by 2 basis points. This may seem negligibly small, but the 
persistence of inflation—particularly the four-quarter trailing average 
that enters into equation (11)—leads to cumulative effects on π* that 
are nonnegligible, as we now show.
Figure 2 plots the impulse responses of inflation, the output gap, 
the short-term interest rate, and π* to a one percent shock to each of 
equations (8) through (11).27 The qualitative features of our empirical 
findings are reproduced very nicely. For example, after a one percent 
inflation shock (the first column), the short-term nominal interest 
rate rises gradually, peaks after a few years, and then returns to a 
long-run steady-state level that is about 35 basis points higher than 
the original steady state. This is due to the fact that the higher levels 
of inflation on the transition path cause the central bank’s long-run 
objective, π*, to rise. A similar response of short-term nominal interest 
rates and inflation can be seen in response to a one percent shock 
27. The model has no indexation to steady-state inflation, so the central bank’s π* 
does not enter the private sector’s equations directly. Rather, it only enters indirectly 
through the private sector’s forecast of πt+1 and yt+1, which depend on the current and 
expected future path for the interest rate (which depends on π*).
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to output (the second column). For the federal funds rate shock (the 
third column), as inflation in the economy falls in response to the 
monetary tightening, the central bank’s long-run target π* gradually 
falls, as well. In the long run, the short-term nominal interest rate 
and inflation settle below their initial levels, producing exactly the 
kind of inverse relation between far-ahead forward rates and short 
rates that we found in the data.
Model with time-varying π* and imperfect information
The above model can also be extended to include the case in 
which the private sector does not directly observe the central bank’s 
inflation objective, π*, and thus must infer it from the central bank’s 
actions, as in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001), Ellingsen and Soderstrom 
(2001), and Erceg and Levin (2003). The advantages of a model with 
imperfect information are threefold. First, it emphasizes that the 
behavior of the term structure is driven by private sector expectations 
of future outcomes, which in the case of imperfect information can 
differ from the actual impulse responses to a particular (unobserved 
or imperfectly observed) shock. Second, a model with imperfect 
information provides a more realistic description of long-term 
interest rate behavior in the United States, since the Federal 
Reserve’s long-term objective for inflation, π*, is unknown to financial 
markets. Third, the presence of imperfect information increases the 
importance and effects of monetary policy shocks in the model, which 
allows for a better calibration to our empirical results than the model 
with perfect information can provide.
To consider the case of imperfect information, equations (8) 
through (11) must be augmented to include a private sector Kalman 
filtering equation:
π π θ π π κ    














    − − − 1 1 1 .                                                   (12)
For simplicity and tractability, we assume that the forms of equations 
(8) through (11), all parameter values, and the shocks επ and εy 
are perfectly observed by the private sector. Thus, only π*, επ*, 
and εi are unobserved. Private agents update their estimate of the 
central bank’s inflation target, denotedπ 
t
* , using equation (12).28 In 
28. This procedure is optimal under the assumptions of normally distributed shocks 
and a normally distributed prior for the inflation target. For other shock distributions, 
the Kalman filter is the optimal linear inference procedure.
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particular, agents observe the deviation of the interest rate from their 
expectation,i i t t − , whereit  is obtained by substitutingπ π  
t t
* * = −1 and 
εt
i = 0 into equation (10), and they reviseπ 
t
* by an amount determined 
by the Kalman gain parameter, κ. Again, we choose (rather than 
estimate) a value for κ of 0.1, which is meant to be illustrative and 
matches the data.29
Figure 3 presents the private sector’s expected impulse responses 
to inflation, the output gap, the short-term interest rate, and the 
central bank’s inflation objective following a shock to each of equations 
(8) through (11). Because this version of the model features imperfect 
information, the impulse responses expected by the private sector on 
impact may differ from the actual impulse responses from a shock. In 
particular, the private sector is initially unable to distinguish between 
the temporary shock, εi, and the permanent central bank preference 
shock, επ*. The expected impulse responses to those two shocks are 
therefore identical, up to a scale factor, even though the actual impulse 
responses to those two shocks play out quite differently over time.30
29. Alternatively, one could derive the optimal value for κ from the variance of the 
shocks to π* and to i, but this value would have to be indirectly inferred anyway since π* 
is unobserved. The value of 0.1 that we use for κ corresponds to a ratio of σi/σπ* = 3.
30. Expected and actual impulse responses for the case of imperfect information 
are calculated as follows. If, starting from steady state, the model is hit by a shock to 
π or to y, then the private sector observes those two shocks, so there is no imperfect 
information and the impulse responses are just like in the perfect information case. If, 
instead, there is a shock to i or to the central bank’s π*, then the private sector does 
not observe the true shock and must estimate what the shock was from the observed 
change in i. The private sector optimally assigns part of the change in i to εi and part 
of the change in i to επ*. Knowing the true structure of the economy, the private sector 
then projects the economy forward using its above two estimates for the shocks to i 
and to π*. This yields the expected impulse response functions at time t. This solution 
also yields the actual equilibrium of the model at time t (and time t only). In period 
t+1, the economy will evolve slightly differently than the private sector had expected 
the previous period (because the private sector did not observe the true shocks to i 
and π*). In particular, i will be a little different again from what the private sector was 
expecting, so agents will think that their previous estimate of π* may have been wrong 
or that there may have been another shock to i or another shock to π*. (Of course, in 
an impulse response function, we do not hit the model with any additional shocks, but 
the private sector does not know this). The private sector thus optimally updates its 
estimate of π* again, and projects the economy forward again using the true structure. 
This solution yields the equilibrium of the model at time t + 1 (and time t + 1 only). 
Come period t + 2, the economy will evolve slightly differently than the private sector 
had expected the previous period, and so forth. We repeat this procedure to obtain the 
entire actual response of interest rates to the shock (which we plot in figure 4). Again, 
the private sector’s estimate of π* does not enter the private sector’s equations directly, 
but only indirectly through the private sector’s forecast of πt+1 and yt+1, which depends 
on the current and expected future path of the interest rate, which in turn depends on 
the private sector’s estimate of π*.
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The expected impulse responses in figure 3 again reproduce 
the qualitative features of our empirical findings nicely. The 
responses to an inflation shock (the first column) or an output 
shock (second column) are identical to the perfect information case 
in figure 2, because we have assumed that the private sector has 
perfect information regarding those two variables. For the case of 
the federal funds rate shock (third column), however, two effects 
are now present. First, when the private sector sees the surprise 
tightening in short-term interest rates, they cannot tell whether the 
shock is purely temporary (εi) or reflects a more permanent change 
in π*, so they respond to the shock by partially revising downward 
their estimate of the central bank’s π*. Inflation in the economy 
thus falls in response to both the monetary tightening and the fall 
in inflation expectations, leading to larger effects than in the perfect 
information case. Second, the central bank’s long-run objective, π*, 
falls over time as inflation comes in below target, as was true in 
the perfect information case. The effect of the additional channel 
arising from imperfect information is to increase the relative size 
and importance of the effects of the interest rate shock on the term 
structure, allowing for a better calibration to our empirical results 
and providing a more realistic model of long-term interest rates in 
the United States.
Note that imperfect information about the central bank’s target, 
π*, plays a role only in the third and fourth columns of the figure. A 
model based solely on imperfect information or imperfect credibility, 
as in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) or Erceg and Levin (2003), would 
be unable to reproduce our findings of excess sensitivity of U.S. 
interest rates to output and inflation surprises as long as shocks to 
επ and εy are observed.
For reference, the actual impulse responses of the model (equations 
7 through 12) are depicted in figure 4. The figure illustrates how 
the differing effects of shocks to i and to π* play out over time. The 
fifth row depicts the evolution of the private sector’s estimate,π 
*, in 
response to each shock. Shocks to inflation or output, about which 
there is no imperfect information, lead to responses of π 
* that are 
identical to those of π*, but the two variables evolve differently for 
the imperfectly observed cases of shocks to i and π*.
Finally, our hypothesis that the private sector’s expectations of the 
central bank’s long-run inflation objective, π*, have varied over time 
is also consistent with measures of these expectations derived from 
survey data. For example, the median ten-year CPI inflation forecast 
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in the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional 
Forecasters fell from 4 percent in the fourth quarter of 1991 (the 
first time the long-run forecast question was asked) to a little under 
2.5 percent by the end of 2002. This decline of about 1.5 percentage 
points compares with a fall of about 2.5 percentage points in ten-year 
nominal forward interest rates over the same period.
4. THE SENSITIVITY OF LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES IN 
CANADA AND CHILE
We have shown that U.S. long-term interest rates are excessively 
responsive to economic news, and that this responsiveness is well 
explained by changes in financial market perceptions of a long-run 
inflation objective in the United States that is not well anchored. We 
now explore whether long-term interest rates are any more stable 
in countries that are explicit inflation targeters than in the United 
States. Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006) consider the cases 
of Sweden and the United Kingdom and find that far-ahead forward 
interest rates are much better anchored in those two countries than 
in the United States. In this paper, we extend the comparison to 
Canada and Chile, which have been formal inflation targeters 
throughout much of the 1990s and 2000s.31 Despite these relatively 
short sample periods, our high-frequency methodology provides us 
with several hundred to a thousand observations for each of these 
countries for our analysis.
4.1 The Sensitivity of Long-Term Interest Rates in 
Canada
We obtained data on Canadian macroeconomic news releases and 
financial market expectations of those releases from two sources: 
31. Both Canada and Chile adopted an inflation-targeting framework in which the 
target was not firmly anchored at first, but was rather successively lowered during a 
transition period. Canada adopted its inflation-targeting framework in 1991, but the 
target was not stabilized at the current level of 1–3 percent until early 1995. Chile, 
in turn, adopted its inflation-targeting framework in 1991, but the target was not 
stabilized at the current level of 2–4 percent until early 2001. For our purposes, the 
latter dates are the more relevant ones. Finally, the adoption of an inflation-targeting 
range rather than a point makes very little difference in theory, because the optimal 
monetary policy is always to aim for inflation to lie at the midpoint of the range, as 
discussed, for example, by Orphanides and Wieland (2000).
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32. Data from Bloomberg were freely available to us through a subscription at 
the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. However, 
Money Market Services (our source for the U.S. data) had data for a number of 
Canadian series that were not covered by Bloomberg and that we thought might be 
important, so we purchased these additional series from Money Market Services. See 
the appendix for details.
33. Details of the data are provided in the appendix. 
34. To compute far-ahead forward real rates in Canada, we use as many of the 
2021, 2026, 2031, and 2036 maturity coupon bond yields as are available on any 
given date and compute the far-ahead forward rates between pairs of securities using 
Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz’s (1983) approximation. We use the average one-
day change in these forward rates in our regressions. We use a longer (twenty- to 
thirty-year-ahead) horizon to proxy for the nine-year-ahead real one-year forward rate 
in Canada, because we simply do not have nine-year-ahead Canadian indexed bond 
data. Although we could use a twenty- or thirty-year-ahead horizon for our nominal 
Canadian forward rates, as well, we judged that the lower liquidity and higher trading 
costs of these longer-horizon securities would more than offset any gains from having 
a precise match in maturity.
Money Market Services and Bloomberg.32 When those data sets 
overlap, they agree very closely. Between these two sources, we have 
data on Canadian capacity utilization, the consumer price index, 
core consumer price index, employment, real GDP, retail sales, 
the unemployment rate, and wholesale trade. Most of these series 
go back to 1996, and a few go back even farther.33 To measure the 
surprise component of Canadian monetary policy announcements, 
we obtained the dates of changes in the Bank of Canada’s target 
overnight interbank rate back to 1995 from the Bank of Canada’s web 
site, and we measured the surprise component of these changes as 
the change in the three-month Canadian Treasury bill on the dates 
of these monetary policy changes.
We obtained data on Canadian nominal bond yields from the Bank 
of Canada’s web site and data on real bond yields from Bloomberg. The 
Bank of Canada provides nominal zero-coupon yield curve estimates 
extending back to the 1980s. Inflation-indexed bond data for Canada 
is more limited: Canada issued its first inflation-indexed bond in 1991 
and its second in 1996, implying that we cannot compute a forward 
real rate for Canada until 1996. Moreover, Canada has issued indexed 
bonds only at the thirty-year maturity. These securities thus have 
extremely long durations and appeal primarily to pension funds, 
insurance companies, and individual investors, resulting in low levels 
of secondary market liquidity, high transactions costs, and observed 
real interest rates that are noisy, particularly in the earlier years of 
our sample.34 Thus, to reduce the noisiness of the data and facilitate 
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comparison with the United States, we begin our analysis of Canada 
in January 1998.35
The results of our analysis for Canada are presented in tables 
3 and 4. Table 3 investigates the sensitivity of Canadian far-ahead 
forward interest rates and inflation compensation to domestic 
economic news. As in previous tables for the United States, the first 
column reports the response of the one-year Canadian nominal spot 
rate to domestic news releases. Short rates respond significantly 
to several of the statistics we consider, with signs and magnitudes 
that are consistent with our earlier estimates for the United States. 
In sharp contrast to the United States, however, far-ahead forward 
nominal rates in Canada (in the second column) respond significantly 
to almost none of these news releases: only the coefficient on monetary 
policy surprises is significant at even the 10 percent level, and that 
result is driven by just one or two observations at the beginning of 
the sample. We find very similar results when we look at far-ahead 
forward inflation compensation (the fourth column). Here again, 
only one coefficient is marginally statistically significant (on the 
core CPI), and even that coefficient seems to be driven by a puzzling 
negative relation between far-ahead forward real interest rates and 
core CPI releases. The joint hypothesis that all coefficients in the 
regression are equal to zero in these two regressions is not rejected 
at any standard level of significance.
In table 4, we explore whether Canadian far-ahead forward 
interest rates and inflation compensation respond to U.S. economic 
data releases and monetary policy announcements. Because Canada 
is a relatively small open economy, it is reasonable to think that 
short-term interest rates and even long-term real rates in Canada 
might be largely determined by developments in the rest of the 
world, particularly developments in the United States. We would 
still expect the long-run values of purely nominal variables, such 
as inflation and inflation expectations, to be determined primarily 
by domestic monetary policy, particularly at the far-ahead horizons 
35. In 1996 and 1997, there are seven forward real rate changes in Canada of 100 
basis points or more in a single day, and seventeen changes of 50 basis points or more. We 
believe that these observations are due to low trading volumes and low liquidity for these 
securities, rather than to perceived changes in economic fundamentals. After January 
1998, there are no changes of 50 basis points or more. While noise and low liquidity may 
still be an issue in the indexed bond data after January 1998, we found that problems 
related to regression outliers were essentially eliminated by restricting attention to 
the post-1997 period. Moreover, this period matches our sample for the United States, 
allowing for closer comparability between our U.S. and Canadian results.
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we are considering in this paper. Thus, while short-term rates and 
perhaps long-term real interest rates in Canada might be expected 
to respond to U.S. economic news, we would still expect far-ahead 
forward inflation compensation and perhaps nominal rates to remain 
largely invariant, if financial markets view the distribution of long-run 
inflation outcomes in Canada as being well-anchored.
The regressions in table 4 include both Canadian and U.S. 
macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy announcements, 
although coefficients on the Canadian releases are not reported to save 
space (they are very similar to those reported in table 3). The first 
column of table 4 shows that short-term interest rates in Canada are 
indeed significantly affected by U.S. monetary policy announcements 
and by many U.S. macroeconomic data releases. Still, far-ahead forward 
nominal rates in the second column) are not very responsive to these 
U.S. economic news releases, with three coefficients exhibiting only a 
marginal degree of statistical significance. The joint hypothesis that all 
coefficients are zero in this far-ahead forward nominal rate regression 
is not rejected at any standard level of statistical significance. The 
same observations generally remain true when we look at far-ahead 
forward inflation compensation (the fourth column): although this 
period includes three U.S. data releases that are significantly related to 
Canadian far-ahead forward inflation compensation at the 10 percent 
level or better, the joint test that all coefficients are equal to zero is 
not rejected at any standard level of significance.
These findings for Canada are reminiscent of those reported by 
Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006) for the United Kingdom 
and Sweden, which were both inflation targeters over much of the 
1990s. In their analysis, the United Kingdom and Sweden displayed 
a much greater anchoring of far-ahead forward nominal rates and 
inflation compensation in response to economic news than did the 
United States. Finally, in the case of the United Kingdom, the Bank 
of England was granted operational independence from Parliament 
in 1998. Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson show that, while the United 
Kingdom has had substantially better-anchored long-term inflation 
expectations than the United States since that date, the data for 
the early 1990s display a sensitivity of forward nominal rates and 
inflation compensation that is very similar to what we observe in 
the United States. All of these findings support the conclusion that a 
credible inflation-targeting framework significantly helps to anchor 
the private sector’s perception of the distribution of future long-run 
inflation outcomes.
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4.2 The Sensitivity of Long-Term Interest Rates in Chile
Chile has a much less extensive set of monthly macroeconomic 
data releases than are available in a more industrialized country 
such as the United States or Canada. We obtained data on Chilean 
monthly macroeconomic data releases and ex ante private sector 
forecasts of these releases from the Central Bank of Chile for four 
macroeconomic statistics: consumer price index inflation, monetary 
policy announcements, real GDP growth in the current quarter, and 
real GDP growth in the previous quarter. However, whereas our 
forecast data for the United States and Canada are at most a few 
days old on release, the Chilean data can be as much as two or even 
three weeks old by the time of the actual release, because the private 
sector macroeconomic forecast is only collected every few weeks. Thus, 
our measure of macroeconomic surprises for Chile is likely to suffer 
from measurement error, which will diminish our chances of finding 
statistically significant effects of releases on interest rates at even the 
short end of the yield curve.36
The Central Bank of Chile also provided us with Chilean real and 
nominal yield curve data. In contrast to the United States and Canada, 
there were no long-term nominal government bonds outstanding in 
Chile until 2002—all long-term government debt issued prior to that 
date was inflation indexed, at least in the last thirty years. This 
lack of long-term nominal debt presumably reflects the fact that the 
Chilean government was unwilling to pay the large risk premiums 
that investors would have demanded to hold such long-term nominal 
liabilities during a period in which markets viewed the government 
and the central bank as being greater credit and inflation risks than 
they are today. Thus, our sample for Chile is restricted to the 2002–05 
period, which, although very short, still provides us with about four 
hundred observations for our analysis given the high frequency of the 
data. Moreover, even with ideal data, it would be difficult to extend 
our sample for Chile further back than 2001: although Chile formally 
adopted an inflation-targeting framework in 1991, the inflation target 
itself was revised downward throughout the 1990s and only stabilized 
at the current range of 2–4 percent in the first quarter of 2001. Finally, 
the Chilean yield curves are based on a relatively small number of 
securities, owing to the smaller size of Chilean financial markets, 
36. Our data on U.S. macroeconomic data releases remain relatively free of 
measurement error, however. We consider the response of Chilean interest rates to 
these U.S. releases, just as we did for Canada in the preceding section.
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so that implied forward rates for Chile are generally much noisier 
than in the United States and Canada, again posing a challenge for 
empirical analysis.
We report the results of our analysis for Chile in tables 5 and 6. 
Table 5 reports the response of Chilean interest rates and inflation 
compensation to domestic economic news. The first column of the 
table reports the estimated responses of short-term Chilean interest 
rates to economic news over this period. Only one of our four Chilean 
macroeconomic data releases—monetary policy announcements—is 
statistically significant, which is consistent with the idea that 
measurement error and a shorter sample make estimation difficult. 
That one statistic is highly significant, however, with a sign and 
magnitude similar to our estimates for the United States. Moreover, 
the joint test of the hypothesis that all coefficients in the regression are 
zero can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level. We thus have 
evidence that our analysis still has power despite the limitations of the 
data. Nevertheless, in contrast to the behavior of Chilean short rates, 
neither far-ahead forward nominal rates nor inflation compensation 
respond significantly to Chilean monetary policy announcements, 
which suggests some degree of anchoring. The hypothesis that all of 
the coefficients in these regressions are zero cannot be rejected at any 
standard level of significance.
In table 6, we address the response of Chilean interest rates to 
U.S. macroeconomic and monetary policy announcements. A few U.S. 
statistics are estimated to have significant effects on Chilean short 
rates, although some of the coefficients (on U.S. nonfarm payrolls 
and unemployment) have signs that are perhaps puzzling. The joint 
hypothesis that all coefficients in the short-rate regression are zero 
is rejected at the 1 percent level. Again, in contrast to short rates, 
far-ahead forward nominal rates and inflation compensation in Chile 
respond to almost no U.S. macroeconomic data releases, with the 
exception of the U.S. unemployment rate release and perhaps U.S. 
monetary policy surprises. The hypothesis that all coefficients in the 
regression are zero is also not rejected at standard significance levels 
in either case. While the Chilean data are clearly much noisier and 
more problematic than in the data for more industrialized countries 
such as Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
our results for Chile are all consistent with those other countries. The 
exercise suggests that the commitment of the central bank to a credible 
long-run inflation objective significantly helps to anchor private sector 
expectations about long-run inflation outcomes.
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4.3 Time-Series Behavior of Forward Rates in Canada, 
Chile, and the United States
Our analysis in the previous sections focused on the conditional 
volatility of forward rates in Canada, Chile and the United States, by 
which we mean the movement of these rates in response to specific 
data releases. Although we took care to include as many variables as 
possible and any macroeconomic data release that seemed important, 
our regressions have nonetheless omitted many factors that influence 
the daily behavior of interest rates at both the short and long ends of 
the yield curve. The R2 values in our regressions are in every case below 
20 percent, even for short-term interest rates.37 Given our argument 
that the relative responsiveness of forward rates in different countries 
to macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy announcements is 
due to different degrees of stability of private sector long-run inflation 
expectations, one might expect to see that other economically relevant 
news that we have omitted would lead to a similar contrast in far-
ahead forward interest rate behavior across our three countries. In 
other words, one might expect to see forward rates in the United 
States that would tend to be more volatile unconditionally as well as 
conditionally, to the extent that long-run inflation expectations in the 
United States are unanchored.
Figure 5 presents unconditional time series plots of far-ahead 
forward nominal rates and inflation compensation for Canada, Chile, 
and the United States. We find a number of interesting observations. 
First, far-ahead nominal rates and inflation compensation are not 
completely stable in any of the three countries. Both high and low 
frequencies exhibit clear variation, the source of which remains an open 
question. Possible explanations include the following: high transaction 
37. This observation is all the more remarkable in light of the fact that we have 
restricted our attention in the regression to only those days on which at least one of 
our right-hand-side variables was nonzero; the R2 values are even lower (though our 
coefficient estimates are very similar) if we perform the regression on all days. Thus, 
even on the days on which important macroeconomic news was released, we can only 
explain a relatively small fraction of the variance of interest rates at even the short end 
of the yield curve. One reason for the low R2 values is that macroeconomic data releases 
often contain much more information than just the simple headline number that we must 
focus on in our analysis. For example, monetary policy announcements by the Federal 
Reserve often contain lengthy statements discussing the motivation for the move and 
even the future outlook for monetary policy; GDP releases contain information about 
its various components, which can independently influence private-sector forecasts 
of future output; and inflation releases contain a detailed breakdown of constituent 
components, which may independently influence forecasts of future inflation. 
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costs in Canadian and Chilean markets that drive observed prices away 
from true shadow values and errors in yield curve estimation resulting 
from a small number of securities outstanding;38 time-varying risk or 
liquidity premiums; variations in financial market perceptions of the 
central bank’s credibility and commitment to its long-run inflation 
objective; changes in the official inflation target itself (both Canada 
and Chile lowered their official targets several times in the early 1990s) 
or perceptions that the central bank’s inflation target might change 
in the future; changes in tax rates or market perceptions that tax 
rates might change in the future; market perceptions that the central 
bank’s preferred measure of inflation might change in the future; and 
differences between the consumption deflator of the marginal investor 
and the price index that is being targeted by the central bank.
Second, despite the variation in our estimates of far-ahead forward 
nominal rates and inflation compensation, the Canadian rates have 
improved spectacularly vis-à-vis the United States. In the first half 
of the 1990s, far-ahead forward rates in Canada were clearly and 
consistently higher and more volatile than in the United States. From 
the late 1990s onward, that situation has completely reversed: far-
ahead forward nominal rates and inflation compensation in Canada 
have been clearly and consistently lower and less volatile than in 
the United States. This is all the more remarkable considering that 
liquidity is lower and transaction costs higher in Canada, and the 
number of outstanding securities with which to estimate a yield curve 
is much smaller; thus, all else equal, one would tend to expect risk 
premiums and measurement error to produce more volatile forward 
rates in Canada. These observations exactly parallel the findings of 
Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006) for the United Kingdom and 
Sweden. The sample period for our Chilean data is shorter, but it 
also shows a remarkable fall in these far-ahead forward rates over 
time, bringing them toward levels that are becoming increasingly 
comparable to those in the United States.
Third, inflation targeting by itself is not a silver bullet that 
suddenly lowers and stabilizes far-ahead forward nominal rates 
38. As mentioned in the preceding sections, Chile has only a few nominal and 
indexed government bonds outstanding, and Canada has only a few highly illiquid 
indexed government securities outstanding. Thus, estimates of forward rates in these 
two countries can be noisy, particularly in Chile and in the early years of the Canadian 
indexed market, when there were only two bonds outstanding and their liquidity was 
very low. (A third Canadian real bond was introduced in 1999 and liquidity in that 
market has increased steadily over time).
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Figure 5. Time Series Plots of Forward Nominal Rates and 
Inflation Compensation
A. One-year forward nominal rate ending in ten years (percent)
B. One-year forward inflation compensation ending in ten years (percent)
Source: Authors' computations.
and inflation compensation. Canada officially adopted an inflation-
targeting framework in February 1991, but the real gains in far-ahead 
forward rates and inflation compensation seem to have come gradually. 
Why this is so remains an open question, but it may be due partly to 
the fact that, although Canada adopted a formal inflation-targeting 
framework in 1991, the official inflation target was revised lower on 
several occasions in the early 1990s. One would hardly expect long-
term inflation expectations to be anchored around the central bank’s 
target if that target itself were perceived by markets to be in transition 
to an unspecified long-run level. Thus, the true date of adoption of a 
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fixed long-run inflation target in Canada might be identified as 1995, 
the date at which the current range of 1–3 percent was adopted and 
regarded as likely to persist (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, in this 
volume, make this point for a number of inflation-targeting adopters).39 
In addition, the initial announcement of an inflation-targeting regime 
in Canada and the initial announcement of the 1–3 percent target 
may have been regarded with some skepticism by financial markets, 
and only gradually did the feasibility of—and the central bank’s 
commitment to—the new targeting regime become clear. These 
factors may also help explain why far-ahead forward nominal rates 
and inflation compensation in Chile remain fairly volatile and have 
exhibited somewhat of a downward trend in the past few years.
Finally, the figure provides direct evidence against the critique 
by Ball and Sheridan (2003) that there are no visible benefits from 
inflation targeting once initial conditions and mean reversion are taken 
into account. Ball and Sheridan’s argument would predict that Canada, 
which began from high levels of inflation expectations in the early 
1990s, would tend to converge back toward the levels in the United 
States over the 1990s. In contrast to this prediction, however, we find 
that inflation expectations in Canada actually overtake those in the 
United States in 1997 and then outperform the United States for the 
next eight years. This is a much stronger performance than can be 
accounted for simply by a tendency for reversion to the mean.
5. CONCLUSIONS
As in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) and Gürkaynak, Levin, 
and Swanson (2006), we find that U.S. long-term forward nominal 
interest rates and inflation compensation are excessively sensitive to 
macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy announcements. In 
contrast, we find that long-term nominal interest rates and inflation 
compensation in Canada display much less sensitivity to economic 
news, while the unconditional volatility of these series over the past 
decade has been markedly lower than in the United States. These 
results are consistent with the findings of Gürkaynak, Levin, and 
Swanson (2006) for Sweden and the United Kingdom, two countries 
that have also maintained explicit inflation targets in recent years
39. The adoption of a target range for inflation (as opposed to a point) is not, in 
itself, a reason for variability of long-term inflation expectations, since the optimal 
monetary policy is always to aim for the midpoint of the range, as noted previously in 
this paper and discussed in detail in Orphanides and Wieland (2000).
12.Gurkaynak Marder Swanson 415-466.indd 01/03/2007, 18:19 459460 R.S. Gürkaynak, A.T. Levin, A.N. Marder, and E.T. Swanson
In the case of Chile, the available sample period is fairly short 
and only a limited set of macroeconomic news releases are readily 
available. Nevertheless, our regression analysis does not indicate any 
excess sensitivity of far-ahead forward interest rates and inflation 
compensation, which is consistent with the hypothesis that inflation 
targeting in Chile has been reasonably successful in anchoring long-
run inflation expectations. The unconditional volatility of these series, 
however, appears to be much higher in Chile than in either Canada 
or the United States, perhaps underscoring the extent to which the 
Chilean economy is still in the process of converging to the economic 
and financial conditions of the more industrialized economies. In 
particular, only a small number of Chilean government securities 
are actively traded in bond markets, and the yields on these securities 
may be quite sensitive to variations in liquidity and other market 
frictions. While not entirely conclusive, these results suggest that the 
presence of a transparent and credible inflation objective can play an 
important role in anchoring long-run inflation expectations in both 
emerging market economies and industrialized countries.
Our findings suggest that the potential welfare gains from reduced 
bond market volatility would be an important subject for future 
research. Although we have not demonstrated any such welfare gains 
in this paper, existing macroeconomic and finance theory identifies 
several strong possibilities: for example, less persistent deviations 
of inflation from target in the short and medium run as a result of 
firmer anchoring of expectations at the long end (Woodford, 2003); 
a greater ability of the central bank to control inflation in the short 
and medium run (ibid.); less volatile long-term nominal interest rates 
and lower risk premiums on nominal rates, which would improve 
the efficiency of investment decisions (Ingersoll and Ross, 1992); 
and a reduced chance of either a 1970s-style expectations trap for 
inflation (Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano, 2003) or an imperfect-
information-driven inflation scare (Orphanides and Williams, 2005). 
To the extent that these benefits are important in practice as well as 
in principle, adopting a more explicit inflation objective could improve 
U.S. economic performance and U.S. monetary policy even beyond the 
successes of the past twenty years.
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APPENDIX
Data on U.S. macroeconomic statistical releases and forecasts 
were obtained from Money Market Services (MMS) through July 
2003, when that company merged with a larger financial institution. 
Beginning in December 2003, the same survey was produced again 
by Action Economics (AE). Both data sets can be obtained from Haver 
Analytics at www.haver.com. From August through November 2003, 
we fill in the holes in the MMS/AE survey data using the releases and 
forecasts reported by Bloomberg Financial Services. For additional 
details about individual macroeconomic series, see Gürkaynak, Sack, 
and Swanson (2003).
We obtained data on Canadian macroeconomic news releases and 
financial market expectations of those releases from two sources: 
Money Market Services and Bloomberg, as discussed in section 4. 
When those data sets overlap, they agree very closely. Between these 
two data sources, we have data on Canadian capacity utilization, 
the consumer price index, core consumer price index, employment, 
real GDP, retail sales, the unemployment rate, and wholesale trade. 
Most of these series go back to 1996, and a few go back even farther. 
To measure the surprise component of Canadian monetary policy 
announcements, we obtained the dates of changes in the Bank of 
Canada’s target overnight interbank rate back to 1995 from the Bank 
of Canada’s web site, and we measured the surprise component of these 
changes using the change in the three-month Canadian Treasury Bill 
on the dates of these monetary policy changes. The exact statistics 
we use, including Bloomberg and MMS mnemonics for those series, 
are reported in table A1.
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